Hume on General Rules and Sexed Subjects

Recent scholarship on general rules describes them as implicit causal beliefs formed through habitual associations of ideas and impressions, functioning as heuristics in daily deliberation. Such generalizations, while being employed automatically, remain subject to the possibility of reflection and critical revision by individuals. This paper investigates the specific generalizations involved in Hume’s conception of how the category "woman" is socially connotated and whether they differ from other general rules in his social theory. General rules are crucial in shaping and reinforcing cultural norms. Hume refers to these rules to explain gender relations, particularly in his discussion of chastity and modesty as artificial feminine virtues (T.3.2.11), which prescribe sexual restraint for women to assure their husbands of paternity. Hume attributes public utility to this norm, recognized by both husbands and society at large, as it supports the stability of the family unit. He also argues that, despite women having the same sexual appetites as men, the general rule linking femininity with chastity applies even when reproductive control is unnecessary: modesty remains a virtue for prepubescent or elderly women due to the stability of habitual association. Hume offers a conception of femininity not based on any inherent female nature but as a norm shaped by socio-cultural demands. In contemporary terms, would be understood as a constructivist account of gender, where the formation of the category of woman follows the same principles governing other social classes, such as profession or national character. This paper argues, however, that the category of "woman" holds a specific status in Hume's theory: its habitual associations, particularly through artificial feminine virtues, link sexual difference to women’s social role in a patriarchal society. The role of such general rules is to naturalize women’s subordination to men. The key question, then, is how such structural power relations affect the functioning of general rules and prejudices, and to what extent these rules can be critically examined through rational scrutiny by the subjects who are exposed to them.