Vom Allgemeinen zur Personlichkeit: Schellings Kritik an Kants Postulatenlehre im Ubergang zur positiven Philosophie

This paper examines Schelling’s critique of Kant’s postulated path to God as a demand of practical reason and his search for an alternative conception of this path. It analyzes how Schelling’s engagement with Kant leads to a redefinition of personality and freedom that goes beyond Kant’s practical philosophy. Schelling argues that Kant’s doctrine of postulates renders reason insufficient to conceive the path to God as entrusted to the individual, practical I. For Schelling, it is not universal reason but the I itself as personality that calls for a transcendent person beyond the world. The study outlines Schelling’s reflections in the 24th lecture of the Presentation of the Purely Rational Philosophy, his critique of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, and his conception of personhood and freedom. It aims to show how the late Schelling opens a new perspective on autonomy, individuality, and the practical dimension of the self.