Virtue, Sex, and Reputation. Hume and Wollstonecraft on Chastity and Modesty

This paper reconstructs a conceptual dialogue between David Hume and Mary Wollstonecraft on sexual virtues—chastity and modesty—and their relation to manners, reputation, and female character. It argues that, despite their shared commitment to a constructivist account of virtue, Hume and Wollstonecraft embody two incompatible visions of the moral significance of feminine norms. For Hume, sexual virtues exemplify the civilising function of artificial virtues, grounded in public interest and stabilized through custom and reputation. For Wollstonecraft, by contrast, these same norms reflect and reproduce women’s subjection, and must be re-described as instances of vice. Juxtaposing their accounts sheds light on the internal tensions of Hume’s moral theory and the normative force of Wollstonecraft’s critique. By examining how passions, gender norms, and virtue interact in their respective systems, the paper offers new insights into eighteenth-century moral philosophy and its legacy for contemporary feminist theory.