Impact of growth and tax on pollution in the presence of corruption

Read full text Summarise with VIRAT
Authors: Sarmistha Banerjee, Bidisha Chakraborty
Cited by: 0

Summary

No summary yet. VIRAT can read this paper and write a plain-language summary of its aim, methods, key findings and limitations.

Summarise with VIRAT Free to try with your Science Catalogs account.

Abstract

In the context of international environmental agreements, where both developed and developing countries commit to mitigating ecological risks, this paper develops a theoretical model to examine the growth-pollution nexus in the presence of rent-seeking behavior by a self-interested government and a firm. We analyze two cases: (1) when lobbying transfers are unilaterally determined by the firm, and (2) when they are jointly determined through a Nash bargaining framework. Furthermore, when tax revenues are endogenously allocated to stimulate growth, we find that higher environmental taxes may paradoxically increase pollution in the Nash bargaining case.

Fields of Study & Subjects

Energy Environment Economic Growth Climate Change Policy and Economics Corruption and Economic Development

Publication details

Journal / source
DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals)
Publication date
1 March 2026
Language
EN