Jesu li iskustva snova uistinu nova?: Filozofsko istraživanje Thompsonove teze

In this paper, I will delve into Evan Thompson’s analysis of dream experiences, which has challenged philosophers and scholars in the past. Many thinkers argue that dreams are not conscious experiences; there is an opposite view in which philosophers still argue for dreams as conscious phenomena. The paper primarily focuses on the hypothesis: ‘Thompson’s explication of dreams as conscious experiences.’ Philosophers like Norman Malcolm and Daniel Dennett critique the eminent received view of dreaming, asserting that dream experiences lack conscious awareness. However, recent philosophical contributions by Thompson criticize their standpoint and posit that dreams are conscious experiences with an independent status during sleep. The paper navigates this philosophical conflict, and I have specifically taken a defence examining Thompson’s explication of dream consciousness, emphasizing the metaphysical and ontological bases of dreams. Lastly, I discuss the limitations of his analysis and also propose a tripartite model of the dynamic nature of our dreaming mind.