Independence for children revisited

It is a rare treat to have one’s work scrutinized so carefully by such a brilliant set of moral and political philosophers, and I am enormously grateful to the contributors to this symposium for their wide-ranging comments on, and criticisms of, Independence for Children.1 In addition to providing challenges to the account I defend, some of the contributors elaborate their own original conceptions of the morality of parenting. Some of these accounts complement Independence, or provide different arguments for views that are close to mine; others defend interesting alternative conceptions, which should attract the attention of philosophers of upbringing. Because I lack the space to respond to every objection or query raised by my critics, I concentrate on what I take to be the most threatening or interesting criticisms and alternative views. My main aim is to clarify my view sufficiently to enable the reader to understand its distinctive character and to gauge whether it has the resources to respond to the challenges raised against it. Some critics in this symposium object to my extension of anti-perfectionist liberalism to parental conduct. I consider those objections in §1. In §2, I make some clarificatory remarks about what counts as parental conduct, and the relationship between non-usurpation and anti- perfectionism. §3 responds to those who argue that anti-perfectionist parenting is impractical or unattractive. Finally, in §4, I discuss two versions of the claim that views that are similar to anti-perfectionist parenting are better defended by appeal to moral considerations that are different to those on which I rely, such as retrospective rejection.