多国籍企業の制度的アービトラージと「母国汚染避難所」としての日本:ダイキン工業淀川製作所におけるPFOA汚染問題の政治経済学的分析
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This paper analyzes the PFOA pollution crisis associated with Daikin Industries’ Yodogawa Plant in Settsu City, Osaka,by integrating strategic-management and political-economy perspectives. Building on the concept of “institutional arbitrage,”it argues that multinational corporations can treat cross-national governance differences not merely as constraints to which they adapt, but as exploitable institutional gaps that enable profit-making strategies through the spatial reconfiguration of risk. The paper develops the concept of a “home-country pollution haven” to revise the conventional Pollution Haven Hypothesis. Rather than focusing on relocation from the Global North to the Global South, it shows how a developed country can function as a haven when domestic regulation and enforcement lag behind international standards and when administrative discretion substitutes for coercive legal accountability. Specifically, Daikin responded to the early-2000s restructuring of PFOS/PFOA-related production in global markets by expanding domestic production and reorganizing its cross-border value chain. To reduce exposure to U.S. manufacturer-liability regimes and adversarial legalism, it pursued a geographic and functional decoupling: higher-risk PFOA-related synthesis activities were concentrated in Japan, while U.S. operations were limited to comparatively lower-risk downstream processing and use. This configuration effectively localized environmental burdens in Japan while capturing market value abroad. The paper further argues that this outcome was enabled by state “calculated inaction,” whereby industrial-policy priorities —including supply-chain considerations linked to export competitiveness—contributed to delayed or weakened precautionary governance. It conceptualizes this arrangement as an “Administrative License to Operate (ALO),” through which regulatory discretion and nonbinding guidance can function as de facto insulation from liability. The paper concludes that the excess profits generated in this configuration are best understood as regulatory rents—i.e., returns derived from avoided internalization of pollution costs—rather than as rewards for technological innovation, and that the resulting risk imposition on residents and workers raises serious human-rights concerns. Overall, the case illustrates a structural pathology in environmental governance: the possibility that a developed state can regress toward extractive institutions that protect specific corporate interests at the expense of public health.
Fields of Study & Subjects
Global trade
sustainability
and social impact
Regulation and Compliance Studies
International Business and FDI
Publication details
- Journal / source
- 摂南経済研究
- Volume
- 第16巻
- Issue
- 第1・2号
- Pages
- 49–82
- Publication date
- 1 March 2026
- Language
- EN